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Abstract
We study how trade liberalization affects formal employment across gender. We
propose a theoretical mechanism to explain how male and female formal employment
shares can respond differently to trade liberalization through labor reallocation across
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Using Mexican data over the period 1993-2001,
we find that tariff cuts increase the probability of working formally for both men
and women within 4-digit manufacturing industries. The formalization of jobs within
tradable sectors is driven by large firms. Constructing a regional tariff measure, we
find that regional exposure to trade liberalization increases the probability of working
formally in the manufacturing sector for both men and women, and especially for
men. However in the service sectors, the probability of working formally decreases
for low-skilled women.
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1 Introduction
Trade integration episodes are expected to foster economic development by reallocating
resources towards more productive sectors and firms. However, the impact of international
trade on labor markets is controversial, as it can also contribute to an increase in inequality
(see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007 and Hanson, 2007 among others). Labor markets in
developing countries are characterized by a dual system where formal and informal jobs
coexist, and by gender inequalities. Informal jobs tend to offer lower earning opportunities,
worse working conditions and little social safety nets compared to formal jobs. Therefore,
reducing informality rates, as well as gender gaps, is a crucial aspect of policies tackling
the issues of inequality and poverty. Recent studies have shown that trade liberalization
affects informality rates (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017a, McCaig and Pavcnik, 2014 and
references herein), as well as gender differences in the labor market (Juhn et al., 2014, Saure´
and Zoabi, 2014, Gaddis and Pieters, 2017 among others). However, the potential impact
of trade liberalization on gender differences in formal and informal employment has been so
far overlooked. This paper is the first to present a theoretical and empirical analysis of the
relationship between trade integration and gender-specific formal employment. Exploiting
sharp tariff cuts in Mexico during the 1990s, this analysis offers a comprehensive picture
of the effect of trade openness on formality rates across gender, both at the sectoral and
local labor market level.
In Mexico, the gender gap in the employment to population ratio has been around 40
percentage points for decades. At the same time, informal employment is an important
phenomenon since it affects more than 50 percent of all workers (Ju¨tting and De Laiglesia,
2009). A joint analysis of informal employment and its gender composition is necessary to
improve our understanding of the impact of globalization on the labor market, and it is
motivated by several observations. Firstly, sectors have different female labor shares as well
as different shares of formal jobs. As trade integration benefits some sectors at the expense
of others, it is likely to change formal employment shares, and differently for men and
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women. Secondly, trade liberalization is likely to generate a “formal-biased technological
change” since it favors the most productive firms that are more intensive in formal labor
because of their size and technology. Finally, there is evidence in support of a stronger
complementarity between capital and female labor than between capital and male labor.1
These differences in the substitution between female and male labor to capital may also
affect the relationship between trade liberalization and labor allocations.
Our analysis is developed in three steps. First, we present some facts on employment
patterns in Mexico over the period 1993 and 2001. Considering both manufacturing and
service industries, we observe that: (i) employment and formal employment shares have
declined in service sectors while they have increased in manufacturing sectors; (ii) formal
labor shares are greater for women than men both in manufacturing and in service sectors;
and (iii) female intensity in formal jobs has increased only in manufacturing sectors.2
Second, we develop a general equilibrium model where trade liberalization affects the
formal employment shares of men and women differently. We follow Blum (2008) and Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak (2015) and use a multi-sector Ricardo-Viner model with two types of
labor. Our framework allows for formal and informal jobs and introduce sectoral hetero-
geneity in formal job intensity. We find that trade liberalization increases the demand for
formal labor if comparative advantage sectors are relatively more intensive in formal jobs.3
We derive the conditions under which the formalization of jobs at the regional level differs
across men and women. More specifically, we find that trade liberalization increases the
demand for male labor by a larger amount relative to female labor in formal jobs if com-
parative advantage sectors are relatively more intensive in formal jobs, and if male labor is
1Black and Spitz-Oener (2010) show how technological change can increase women’s productivity rel-
ative to men’s through a decline in routine task inputs. Juhn et al. (2014) develop a model where firms
upgrade their technology with trade integration which lowers their need for physically demanding tasks
and thus increases their demand for female labor.
2Our analysis includes manufacturing sectors, also referred to as tradable sectors, and service sectors,
also called non-tradable sectors.
3Figure 4 in the online Appendix shows that over the 1990s Mexican manufacturing sectors with large
net export shares are on average more intensive in formal labor than manufacturing sectors with low net
export shares.
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relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor.4
Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between Mexican import
tariffs on U.S. products and the probability of holding a formal job for men and women.
Mexico represents an interesting case study for at least three reasons. First, among NAFTA
members, Mexico was the country with the highest tariffs and experienced the largest cut
during the NAFTA phase-in. Over the period 1993-2001, Mexican import tariffs on U.S.
products declined on average by 14 percent. Second, Mexico has a large informal sector
which increased in the 1990s. Finally, the Mexican labor market exhibits striking gender
differences. The extremely low female labor force participation is one illustration of this:
less than 40 percent of women participated to the labor force in the early 1990s, and this
share remained below 50 percent in the early 2000s.
We use individual data from the Mexican labor force survey called Encuesta Nacional
de Empleo Urbano (ENEU). This survey enables us to identify whether working individuals
belong to the formal or informal segment of the labor market. To characterize the informal
segment, we focus on wage employment. We define informal employees as those who do not
have access to health insurance and social security coverage which are mandated benefits
for legal labor contracts. Additionally, the ENEU provides information on individuals’
industry affiliation at the 4-digit level, and location at the municipality level. This enables
us to precisely match individuals to tariff changes at a disaggregated sectoral level and to
local exposure to tariffs. The local labor market approach allows us to evaluate the general
equilibrium effects of trade for a regional economy and to disentangle the effects of trade
liberalization across tradable and non-tradable sectors. In fact, the non-tradable industries
may be indirectly affected by changes in tariffs through spillovers and labor reallocation
across sectors.
Our estimation strategy uses a linear probability model to examine the effect of trade
on the probability of being in formal employment. We take two approaches: one at the
industry level exploiting time-variation in industry tariffs and the other at the municipality
4This is a common assumption since the seminal article of Galor and Weil (1996).
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level exploiting differences in industry-mix across municipalities and constructing gender-
specific local exposures to tariffs. For each approach we provide a set of robustness checks
to account for possible confounding factors and additional threats to identification. At the
4-digit industry level, we find that individuals working in an industry experiencing the av-
erage reduction in tariffs of 14 percentage points experience an increase in the probability
of holding a formal job by 2 percentage points relative to individuals in industries facing
no reduction in tariffs. Our findings show no gender differences within disaggregated in-
dustries. We additionally find that this formalization of jobs within industries is driven by
big firms, while informality increases with trade liberalization in very small firms. These
findings are consistent with a reallocation of employment into trade-oriented firms that are
larger and more intensive in formal jobs.
The regional effect of trade liberalization is captured by constructing a local measure
of exposure to tariffs at the municipality level, where the sectoral tariffs are weighted
by sectoral employment shares in each municipality.5 Exploiting the regional variation
in exposure to tariffs, we find that men living in a municipality experiencing the average
reduction in tariffs of 14 percentage points are almost 6 percentage points more likely to hold
a formal job than men in municipalities facing no reduction in tariffs. However, on average
women do not experience an increase in the probability of holding a formal job. This result
is related to the effect of local tariffs on manufacturing sectors and to the spillover effect on
service sectors. In the manufacturing sector, we find that trade liberalization increases the
probability of working in the formal sector for both women and men. Our results at the
regional level show that the formalization effect in manufacturing sectors is larger than what
we obtain within 4-digit manufacturing sectors. This suggests that regional liberalization
generates labor reallocation across 4-digit manufacturing industries, which contributes to
a formalization of employment in manufacturing industries. The formalization effect is
bigger among men, in particular for highly educated workers. These results are consistent
5We use the term “region” to refer to local labor markets. Notice that these local labor markets
correspond to “municipalities” in the empirical part that uses ENEU data.
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with a Ricardo-Viner model in which the CA sectors are more intensive in formal labor
and where male labor is relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor.
In the service sectors, in contrast to the manufacturing sectors, trade liberalization
increases the probability of working informally only among low-skilled women. Using a
different sample of working-age individuals, which includes individuals not in paid employ-
ment, we find that the increase in informality in the service sector is partly related to
women entering the labor market with informal jobs in the service sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the novel contributions of this
paper with respect to the existing literature. Section 3 provides a description of the data,
and an industry decomposition of changes in the formal employment share. Section 4
proposes a theoretical framework and derives predictions to be tested. Section 5 describes
the empirical strategy. The empirical results and robustness checks are presented in Section
6 for the industry level approach and in Section 7 for the local labor market approach.
Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, our paper relates to studies
on trade and informality. A branch of this literature has paid attention to industry-level
response of formal and informal employment to trade shocks. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003),
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), and Bosch et al. (2012) find no or minimal effect of
trade liberalization on informality within sectors in Brazil. Paz (2014) and McCaig and
Pavcnik (2014) find that reductions in trading partner tariffs decrease informality in Brazil
and Vietnam respectively.6 In contrast, we look at how changes in Mexican import tariff
on U.S. products affected formal employment in Mexico during the 1990s. Similarly to
Aleman-Castilla (2006), we find that a reduction in the Mexican tariff increases formality
6Becker (2017) proposes a model with firm heterogeneity which shows that trade liberalization reduces
informal employment.
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rates within-industry. We show that this result is robust to controlling for the U.S. import
tariff. Our analysis contributes to the literature on trade and informality at the sector
level with several novel insights. First, we show that, within 4-digit industries women and
men are similarly affected in their formal employment probability. Second, we find that
the effect differs across firms’ size. Considering trade liberalization in Argentina, Cruces
et al. (2017) find that industries with a large share of employment concentrated in small
firms, experience an increase in informality. We complement their analysis using individual
data and find that workers in small firms have a higher probability of holding an informal
job when sectoral tariffs decline. On the contrary, workers in bigger firms experience an
increase in formal employment probability with a drop in the sectoral tariff.
Our work also relates to the literature that adopts a local labor market approach to
analyze the relationship between regional trade exposure and labor market outcomes. For
instance, we relate to studies on wages (Chiquiar, 2008 for Mexico; Kovak, 2013 and Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak, 2015 for Brazil), employment (Autor et al., 2013 for the U.S., Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak, 2017a for Brazil and references herein), child labor and poverty (Ed-
monds et al., 2009; Edmonds et al., 2010; Topalova, 2010; Kiskatos and Sparrow, 2015).
More recently, Autor et al. (2018) studied how adverse local labor market shocks due to
rising import penetration affect marriage, fertility, and children’s living circumstances. Our
theoretical model is related to Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015), where they use two types of
workers. Unlike them, we explore gender differences, rather than educational differences,
and we focus on employment rather than wages. Moreover, we add the formality dimen-
sion and have two types of jobs, formal and informal. Our empirical analysis complements
the literature on trade and local labor markets by considering gender differences across
formal and informal employment during Mexican trade liberalization. Previous work on
developing countries found limited effects of trade liberalization on informality (Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2003, Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011, Bosch et al., 2012, Paz, 2014, Mc-
Caig and Pavcnik, 2014 among others). Adopting a long difference identification strategy
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for Brazil, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017a) find that regions facing larger tariff cuts ex-
perienced prolonged declines in formal sector employment and earnings relative to other
regions. In this paper, we rely on yearly variation in tariffs between 1993 and 2001 and
find different results. Specifically, we show that regional exposure to Mexican import tar-
iff reductions lead to an increase in the probability of formal employment for men only.
Moreover, we find that regional liberalization affect tradable and non-tradable sectors dif-
ferently. A stronger exposure to tariffs reduction leads to a higher probability of formal
employment in the tradable sectors for both men and women. In turn, however, it also
increases informal employment probability in non-tradable industries for women only. As
we discuss later, our different results may be driven by the specific sample used (only urban
areas), methodology (shorter run evaluation) and country setting. In the case of Mexico,
export-oriented sectors benefited from the fall in Mexican tariffs as intermediate inputs
became cheaper. Indeed, Mexican exports to the U.S. use a very high share of U.S. inputs
(de Gortari, 2017). It is also worth pointing out that our findings are in line with Atkin
(2016) who documents a formal employment boom in Mexican export-oriented manufac-
turing industries over the 1990s while the employment share of the manufacturing sector
has been increasing at the expense of the services sector in Mexico. Besides, our results are
also in line with some results of Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) who find (Table 9) that
lower intermediate-input tariffs are associated with significantly lower odds of transitions
into unemployment and out of the labor force, resulting in significantly more transitions
into formality. However, reductions in product-market tariffs have opposite effects.
Finally, our approach closely relates to a growing number of papers emphasizing the
gender-specific effects of international trade. This literature proposes different channels
to investigate the effect of trade liberalization on gender gaps in labor force participation
and wages. Trade liberalization can contribute to a reduction in the gender gap due to
taste-based discrimination through a competition effect (see Black and Brainerd, 2004 and
Ben Yahmed, 2012 among others). Other papers stress the importance of male and female
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differences in productive characteristics and how their returns evolve with trade integration
(Aguayo-Tellez et al., 2010; Juhn et al., 2013; Juhn et al., 2014; Saure´ and Zoabi, 2014;
Do et al., 2016; Gaddis and Pieters (2017)). Unlike previous studies on Mexico, i.e.,
Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010) and Juhn et al. (2014), this paper focuses on the impact of
Mexico’s trade liberalization on gender differences considering not only formal employment
but also informal employment. Our results show that trade liberalization has gender-
specific effect on formality, especially in service sectors. To account for shifts between
employment and non-employment, we extend our analysis using the whole sample of the
working-age population. Differently from Gaddis and Pieters (2017) who use Brazilian data,
we find that the Mexican trade liberalization over the 1990s contributed to a small increase
in female paid employment probability, but did not lead to a significant change in male paid
employment probability. While Gaddis and Pieters (2017) do not differentiate formal from
informal employment, we show that this dimension is important. The smaller formalization
effect of trade among women is partly due to women moving from non-employment into
informal jobs with exposure to tariff reductions. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first paper to investigate the effects of trade liberalization on formal and informal
employment by gender.
3 Formal Employment Shares in Mexico
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urban (ENEU),
which is a quarterly labor force survey conducted by the Mexican National Institute of
Statistics (INEGI). This survey provides information on individuals’ socio-economic char-
acteristics, firm size, industry affiliation at the 4-digit level (CAE), and location at the
municipality level.7 The survey is representative of cities with over 100,000 inhabitants,
7This survey has been used by several authors, including for example Robertson (2004), Verhoogen
(2008), and Bosch and Manacorda (2010).
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and covers only urban areas. The primary sampling units are municipalities. Over time
the sample size of the survey has constantly increased as cities were added every year. The
total number of municipalities over the the period 1993-2001 is 216, with municipalities
entering and exiting every year. To avoid any selection issue, we decided to take the most
conservative approach, and keep all municipalities reported in each year over the period
1993-2001.8
Our main sample is restricted to working individuals between the ages of 16 and 60.
We distinguish three types of employment: formal and informal wage employment, and
self-employment.9 Informal wage workers are employees who report not having health in-
surance or social security coverage, although their status should entitle them to access to
these mandated benefits. Self-employed individuals report being “own-account workers”
(trabajador por su cuenta) as their main job. Self-employed individuals differ from em-
ployers as they own very small businesses; more than 80% of them have no employees.
However the ENEU survey does not allow us to clearly distinguish between formal and
informal self-employment. Therefore, our preferred measure for distinguishing formal from
informal employment only considers wage workers. In the robustness checks, we extend
the definition of informal employment, including both informal wage employment and self-
employment. Additional descriptive statistics on formal and informal employees and the
self-employed are provided in Table 10 in Appendix A.
To capture variation in trade liberalization, we merge the ENEU labor force survey
with Mexican import ad-valorem tariffs on U.S. products at the 4-digit level from Iacovone
and Javorcik (2010). Additionally, since NAFTA also lowered U.S. tariffs on Mexican
exports to the U.S., it is important to control for this contemporaneous change in trade
policy. Therefore, in our sensitivity analysis we use U.S. import tariffs from Feenstra et al.
8See Table 8 in Appendix A for details on the sample size. Alternative approaches suggest focusing on
the subset of municipalities that are always surveyed in the sample period. Our results are not affected by
the sample choice, which indicates that the composition of municipalities in the ENEU is not correlated
to changes in trade policy.
9To account for shifts between employment and non-employment, we replicate our analysis using the
sample of working-age individuals, including individuals in unemployment and out of the labor force.
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(2002).10 More details on our industry and regional tariff measures are provided in Section
5.1 and in Appendix A.
3.2 Trade Liberalization and Employment Shares
After a long period of import substitution strategy, Mexico started to move toward a
liberalized trade regime in the 1980s. In 1994 it joined NAFTA and substantially lowered
its tariffs on the U.S. and Canadian markets. Figure 1 shows the evolution of employment
shares and formal employment shares in the manufacturing and service sectors, and the
drop in the average Mexican import tariff on U.S. products during the 1990s.
Figure 1: Employment Trends and Mexican Tariffs
(a) Employment share in manufacturing
sectors
(b) Employment share in service sectors
(c) Formal employment shares in manufac-
turing and services
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENEU, Mexico.
10See Schott’s web page http : //faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/subcv.htm.
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Mexican import tariffs on U.S. products were reduced on average by 14 percentage
points, from more than 15 percent in 1993 to less than 1.5 percent in 2003 (panels a).
At the same time, the employment share in the manufacturing sector has increased at
the expense of the employment share in the service sector (panels a and b). The drop in
the Mexican average tariff applied to U.S. products also coincides with the reallocation of
formal employment from manufacturing to service sectors (panel c).
Figure 2 shows how formal employment has changed differently for male and female
employees during the trade liberalization period. Overall, female employees have a higher
formality rate (between 80 and 75%) than male employees (between 70 and 74%). However,
the gender gap in the formality rate among wage workers has been shrinking. It was almost
10 percentage points in 1993, and was reduced to about 4 percentage points in 2001. The
formality rate has increased in the manufacturing sectors for both men and women (panel
b). In contrast, in the service sector, the formality rate has decreased for women, while it
has remained fairly stable for men (panel c). The next section provides a decomposition
analysis of changes in the female share among formal employees.
3.3 Between and Within-Industry Decomposition
In this section, we decompose the change in men and women’s formal employment shares
(henceforth FS) into within and between-industry changes. The decomposition is expressed
as follows:
∆FSgt =
∑
s
∆FSgst × Egs +
∑
i
∆Egst × FSgs (1)
where FSgt denotes the share of formal employees in total employment of group g = {f,m},
where f denotes female and m denotes male. ∆FSgt = FSgt−FSgt−1 is the change in the
formal employment share over the period. FSgst denotes the share of formal employees in
industry s employment of group g and Egs is industry s employment of group g.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (1) is the within-industry component
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Figure 2: Formality rate among wage workers
(a) All sectors (b) Manufacturing
(c) Services
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ENEU, Mexico.
and represents the part of the aggregate change in FSgt due to changes in industry specific
FSgst, holding constant the employment shares of industries. The second term is the
between-industry component. It reflects changes in the aggregate FSgt due to changes in
the employment shares of industries, holding constant the industry specific FSgst.
Tables 1 and 2 present the decomposition using a different level of industry disaggre-
gation and a different sample of industries. The decomposition is done first over the entire
sample period, and then using two different sub-samples: 1994-1998 and 1998-2001. Ta-
ble 1 presents the decomposition into between and within industry changes at the 1-digit
level of disaggregation using the sample of workers in the manufacturing and the service
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sectors. Column (1) in Table 1 shows that the share of formal employees among male
Table 1: Decomposition across 1-digit sectors
Total Within Between
(1) (2) (3)
1994-2001
Female -.02 -.027 .007
Male .024 .021 .003
1994-1998
Female -.031 -.038 .007
Male .008 .004 .004
1998-2001
Female .011 .011 -.001
Male .016 .016 0
Notes: Two 1-digit sectors, manufacturing and service sectors, only.
employees has increased in the overall economy by 2.4 percentage points, but it has de-
creased among women by 2 percentage points. These changes are driven by within 1-digit
industry changes. In the manufacturing sector, the FS has substantially increased over
the period, especially for men, while the FS in the service sector was in decline until 1996
and especially for women (see Figure 2). Reallocation of employment from the service to
manufacturing sectors (between-industry change) contributed to a small increase in the
overall FS.
Table 2 focuses only on the manufacturing sectors and relates changes in aggregate FS
into between and within 4-digit industries changes. Between 1994 and 2001, women’s FS
increased by more than 2 percentage points, and by almost 4 percentage points for men.
This increase in the overall manufacturing FS is explained by both within and between
4-digit industry changes. Within-industry changes contribute positively to the increase in
the FS for both men and women. The reallocation of labor into manufacturing industries
with a high FS has also contributed to the increase in the aggregate FS, except between
1994 and 1998 for women.
Overall, the increase in the FS has been more pronounced for men than for women.
Both within and between-industry changes explain changes in the share of formal jobs
14
Table 2: Decomposition across 4-digit manufacturing sectors
Total Within Between
(1) (2) (3)
1994-2001
Female .021 .028 -.007
Male .039 .027 .012
1994-1998
Female .006 .017 -.011
Male .028 .017 .011
1998-2001
Female .012 .011 .002
Male .011 .007 .004
Notes: More than 250 4-digit sectors. Only manufacturing sectors.
in wage employment but within-industry changes explain a bigger share of the aggregate
change. In the following sections we investigate theoretically and empirically how trade
liberalization contributes to those changes. Our theoretical model focuses on how trade
liberalization affects formal employment shares through between industry reallocation in
different ways for men and for women. We borrow from recent trade models to explain
the changes in formal employment shares within tradable industries. We then conduct
an empirical investigation of the impact of trade on female and male formal employment
through both within and between industry reallocation.
4 Theoretical Framework
The Ricardo-Viner model developed in this section follows Kovak (2013) in using Jones
(1975) to model each region within a country as a specific-factor economy. Then, similarly
to Blum (2008) and Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015), we consider a structure with two labor
factors, in this case female and male labor, and analyze labor reallocation across tradable
and non-tradable sectors. Finally, to study how employment reallocation across sectors
following trade liberalization affects female and male formal employment, we introduce
sectoral heterogeneity in formal job intensity. The following sections present the setup of
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the model and then highlight the effect of trade liberalization on male and female formality
rates at the regional level.
4.1 The Setup
We consider a country composed of several regions, indexed by r, that produces N goods,
M of which are internationally tradable and can be either imported or exported. Since
the focus is on a particular region, we suppress the subscript r on all terms. Production
uses capital, K, and two types of labor, female and male labor, Lf and Lm. Labor is
assumed to be supplied inelastically, fully employed, and perfectly mobile across industries
but not across regions. Capital is not mobile between sectors or regions in the short-
run. Technologies may differ across sectors, but are the same across regions within each
sector. Production exhibits constant returns to scale, and factors and goods markets are
competitive. All regions face the same prices for the tradable goods, which are taken as
given on the international market.
Each sector s, either tradable or non-tradable, is characterized by an exogenous share
of formal jobs, αs. More specifically, men and women can be hired as formal or informal
workers within the same sector. Formal employment for each gender group g, with g =
{f,m}, and sector s, is defined as Lϕgs = αsLgs, where ϕ stands for formal. The term αs
captures sector heterogeneity in formal labor intensity.11
This set-up generates a link between male and female formality rates and trade liber-
alization, which is the focus of the next section. The model is presented in its entirety in
Appendix F, where we explicitly solve for the endogenous variables, such as factor returns,
sectoral employment allocations, sectoral output, and prices of non-tradable goods.
11We assume that formal labor intensity in a sector is the same across gender. Our results would hold
if we allow the formal labor intensity to differ between men and women within each sector.
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4.2 Trade and Formal Employment
4.2.1 Trade and Formal Employment at the Sector Level
The model does not endogenize within-industry changes in formal employment. Changes
in the share of formal labor in a sector, αˆs = Lˆϕgs − Lˆgs could increase with trade through
two channels. First, firms may increase their demand for formal labor with “formal-biased
technological change”. Exporters may invest in new technologies that require firm-specific
knowledge or specific training of workers giving firms incentive to retain workers and provide
formal contracts. Second, trade liberalization can increase the share of formal labor at the
sectoral level by reallocating employment to trade-oriented firms, which are more intensive
in formal jobs (see Aleman-Castilla (2006), Nataraj (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2014)
among others). In fact, it is well established that trade integration induces employment
reallocation across heterogeneous firms within sectors. Since trade-oriented firms tend to
be larger and employ more skilled workers, they should also be more likely to hire formal
workers.
The theoretical model of this paper does not focus on changes in αs. Rather, we use
our model to explore the effects of trade liberalization on regional gender gap in formality
rates through labor reallocation between sectors. We discuss in section 4.2.2 how trade
liberalization may affect the formality rate of men and women at the regional level in
different ways.
4.2.2 Trade and Formal Employment at the Regional Level
This section adopts a local labor market approach and investigates how the demand for
formal labor evolves with trade liberalization in a regional economy. The share of group g
formal employment is given by:
Lϕg
Lg
=
∑
s αsLgs∑
s Lgs
(2)
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where we consider a particular region and suppress the subscript r on all terms. Notice
that the change in formal employment share can be written as: Lˆϕg − Lˆg. Since labor
supply is fixed at the regional level, Lˆg = 0, the change in formal labor share is equal to
the change in the level of formal labor:
Lˆϕf =
∑
s
λϕfs × Lˆfs(ps, σffk,s, σmfk,s, θ) (3)
Lˆϕm =
∑
s
λϕms × Lˆms(ps, σmmk,s, σfmk,s, θ) (4)
where λϕfs =
αsLfs
Lϕf
and λϕms =
αsLms
Lϕm
represent the fraction of female and male formal
employment in industry s. Lˆfs and Lˆms represent the change in the demand for female and
male labor in sector s, which depend on different elements. Firstly, on the price of the good
produced in sector s, ps. Secondly, on the elasticity of substitution between factor g and
the specific capital Ks with respect to the relative price of factors Lg, and Ks; elasticities
are denoted σgfk,s and σ
g
mk,s. And finally on a vector θ representing the cost shares of each
factor of production, θ = {θfs, θms, θks}.12
Moving from autarky to trade integration corresponds to an increase in the price of
the goods in which the country has comparative advantage (henceforth CA), pˆs > 0. As
explained in Appendix F, the change in sector s labor demand goes in the same direction as
the price change. Therefore, trade liberalization affects female and male labor demand in a
given sector in the same direction. However, the proportion of this change will differ, and
this is because the substitution between male labor and capital differs from the substitution
between female labor and capital.
To understand what happens to employment at the regional level, we need to consider
the endowment of the industry specific factor, Ks, across regions. In our model, if region
r is relatively well endowed with industry s specific factor, then that region allocates a
12See equations 22 and 23 in Appendix F for more details.
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greater share of its labor to industry s. Similarly, an increase in the price of that industry
s has a larger positive effect on employment in that region r compared to other regions.
Therefore, the formalization of regional employment is greater in comparative advantage
sectors that are larger, more intensive in formal labor (i.e. large λϕgs), and with a more
elastic labor demand, meaning that they absorb a larger amount of labor from non-CA
sectors.13
Prediction 1. At the regional level, formal employment increases if CA sectors in that
region are larger, more intensive in formal labor, and have more elastic labor demands than
the comparative disadvantage sectors.
We now use our model to make predictions about changes in female and male formal
employment shares at the regional level. We use equations (3) and (4) to compute the
differential change in formal employment :
Lˆϕm − Lˆϕf =
∑
s
λϕms × Lˆms(ps, σffk,s, σmfk,s, θ)−
∑
s
λϕfs × Lˆfs(ps, σmmk,s, σfmk,s, θ) (5)
where Lˆms and Lˆfs are characterized by equations (22) and (23) in Appendix F. We will
use equation (5) to analyze how a particular region’s gender gap in formal employment is
affected by changes in the price of goods.
First, we follow Galor and Weil (1996) and assume that male labor is relatively more
substitutable for capital than female labor. In this case, after a price increase, male labor
demand should increase more than female labor demand in CA sectors. Second, if CA sec-
tors are more intensive in formal labor than non-CA sectors, then trade liberalization also
increases the overall share of formal jobs. This happens because labor is reallocated from
less to more formal intensive sectors.14 Under these two conditions, trade liberalization
13Note that equations (3) and (4) can be expressed for all sectors s, and for a subset of sectors such as
the tradable sectors only.
14Combining export data from CEPII with ENEU survey, we show that over the 1990s Mexican manufac-
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generates more male than female formal jobs.
Prediction 2. Within a region, trade liberalization increases the share of male formal
employment by a larger amount relative to female labor demand if: a) in CA sectors, male
labor is relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor, and b) CA sectors are
larger and more intensive in formal labor than non-CA sectors.
Although all regions face the same changes in international prices, each region has
a different industry mix meaning that the effect of trade on the gender gap in formal
employment differs across regions. The magnitude of the change in regional gender gap in
formal employment depends on the size of the CA sectors and on the concentration of men
and women across sectors in that region. More specifically, in a given region, if men are
concentrated in relatively large CA sectors, then this region experiences a greater increase
in men formal employment relative to women.
We now move to the empirical investigation and study the effects of trade liberalization
on formal employment across gender in Mexico. We will use Predictions 1 and 2 to interpret
our results.
5 Empirical Strategy
This section describes the measures of trade policy used to capture the relationship between
trade liberalization and the probability of working as a formal employee at the sectoral and
regional level.
turing sectors with large net export shares are on average more intensive in formal labor than manufacturing
sectors with low net export shares. See Figure 4 in the online Appendix E.2.
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5.1 Measures of Trade Liberalization
We take two different approaches to capture trade liberalization. The first approach uses
ad-valorem Mexican import tariffs on U.S. products, τst, to study the effect of trade policy
on gender sorting across formal and informal jobs within 4-digit manufacturing industries.15
This tariff measure varies across manufacturing sectors and years.
The second approach consists in constructing a Mexican import tariff measure at the
municipality level to capture potential labor reallocation across sectors, tradable and non-
tradable, and highlight spillover effects of trade liberalization on non-tradable sectors. Fol-
lowing the literature on the local effects of trade, we use an employment-weighted average
tariff of tradable industries active in each municipality. The original tariff is defined at
the industry level and is the same across regions. Since we apply weights defined at the
industry and municipality level, the regional tariff varies across municipalities and over
time.
Following our theoretical model, we construct weights using formal employment in each
industry and municipality. Additionally, our theoretical mechanism indicates that men and
women in a given region might be exposed to trade liberalization in different ways because
they work in different industries facing different tariff declines. Therefore, our measure also
uses gender-specific employment weights. The local tariff varies across municipalities, years
and gender. This weighted-average tariff is related to other measures used in the literature
on local effects of trade with heterogeneous labor as in Autor et al. (2018) for men and
women, and in Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) for skilled and unskilled workers.
Finally, we follow Kovak (2013) and do not include non-tradable sectors in the weighted
average. Therefore, our weights only consider formal employees in tradable industries in
each municipality.16 To avoid endogeneity issues due to changes in the industry mix over
15See Appendix A for a description of Mexican import tariffs.
16An alternative approach consists in assigning a zero tariff to non-tradable industries, as in Topalova
(2010). This approach is preferable only if workers cannot freely move from tradable to non-tradable
sectors. Using this alternative local tariff measure, which accounts for the share of people working in the
non-tradable sectors, confirms our main findings. Results are available upon request.
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time, our weights are based on the employment structure of each municipality, using the
first year in which the municipality enters the survey.17
The gender-specific municipality tariff is then constructed as follows:
τgrt =
∑M
s Form Emplgrs,1993 × τst∑M
s Form Emplgrs,1993
(6)
where g indicates gender g = {female, male}, r indicates the municipality, s the industry
within the subset of manufacturing tradable industries, s = 1, ...,M , and t indicates time.
5.2 Regression Analysis
Industry-specific tariffs and within-industry formalization
We start by considering the importance of increased trade openness on male and female
employment in formal and informal jobs within sectors. The following linear probability
model (henceforth LPM) is estimated on the sample of formal and informal workers in
manufacturing industries:
Fisrt = αXisrt + β1τst + β2τst × female+ µs + ur + vt + isrt (7)
where Fisrt is an indicator that takes the value one if individual i is employed as a formal
worker in industry s, region r at time t, and zero if the individual works as an informal em-
ployee. Xisrt is a vector of specific individual and household characteristics which includes
a female dummy, age, age square, number of years of education, migration background,
whether the individual lives with a partner, is the head of the household, the number of
household members, the highest level of education in the household, and the share of house-
hold members holding a formal job. τst is the Mexican import tariff at the 4-digit industry
level, and τst × female is the interaction term between the import tariff and the female
17We have also computed the municipality average tariff using alternative weights, such as the employ-
ment structures in 1992, using the subset of municipalities already surveyed in 1992. The results do not
change.
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indicator. µs, ur, and vt are a set of 4-digit sector, municipality, and year fixed-effects. To
allow for different effects of trade liberalization on high versus low-skilled workers, we also
interact the tariff variable with an indicator variable equals to one if the individual has
more than nine years of education.
The coefficient β2 captures the differential effect of trade liberalization on the probability
of women holding a formal job compared to men. The sum between the coefficients β1
and β2 gives the average marginal effect of a change in the Mexican import tariff on the
female probability of being a formal employee within a tradable sector. To account for firm
heterogeneity, we use a similar specification as equation (7), and interact our tariff measure
with firm size. More precisely, we compute four firm-size categories: 1) firms with 10 or
fewer employees, 2) firms with 11 to 50 employees, 3) firms with 51 to 250 employees, and
finally 4) firms with more than 250 employees. To limit the risk of potential threats to
identification, we later perform a set of robustness checks. First, we consider other channels
that might be responsible for changes in the formal and informal employment. Then,
we tackle additional concerns regarding threat to internal validity using an instrumental
variable approach.
Municipality-specific tariffs and formalization in local labor markets
To estimate the effect of trade liberalization on the formalization of jobs at the local level,
we use gender-specific municipality tariff described in equation (6). This local tariff varies
across gender, municipalities and years. We estimate the following equation:
Firt = αXirt + β1τmrt ×malei + β2τfrt × femalei + ur + vt + irt (8)
where Firt is an indicator that takes the value one if individual i is employed as a formal
worker in region r at time t, and zero if the individual works as an informal employee. Xisrt
is a vector of specific individual characteristics similar to the one used in the specification
at the industry level defined by equation (7). τmrt and τfrt are male and female exposure
to the Mexican import tariff in municipality r at time t. We interact the gender-specific
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municipality tariffs with the corresponding gender dummy. Therefore, β1 and β2 captures
the effect of regional trade liberalization on men’s and women’s probability of holding a
formal job respectively. We control for municipality fixed-effects ur and year fixed-effects vt.
Since we want to identify the average trade liberalization effect within a municipality, and
not the average effect within an industry and municipality, we do not control for industry
fixed-effects.
We allow for different effects of trade liberalization depending on level of education
by interacting the regional tariff variable with an indicator variable equals to one if the
individual has more than nine years of education. Additionally, to disentangle the effects of
local exposure to trade liberalization across tradable and non-tradable sectors, we interact
the regional tariff variable with a 1-digit service sector dummy. Similarly to the industry
level regressions, we later perform a set of robustness checks.
6 Empirical Results within Tradable Industries
We begin by examining the effect of sector specific tariffs on the probability of holding a
formal job within 4-digit tradable sectors and explore the role of firm heterogeneity. The
estimates of equation (7) are reported in Table 3.
The negative coefficient associated with sectoral tariffs τst indicates that trade liberal-
ization leads to a formalization of jobs within 4-digit manufacturing industries. According
to column (1), individuals working in an industry that experienced the average reduction
in tariffs of 14 percentage points are 2 percentage points more likely to hold a formal job
than individuals in an industry facing no reduction in tariffs. In column (2), the interac-
tion between sectoral tariffs and the female dummy is insignificant. The impact of trade
liberalization on formal employment within 4-digit sectors does not vary across gender. In
columns (3) and (4) we consider the role of education and interact sectoral tariffs with
workers’ level of education. Column (3) shows that trade liberalization does not affect
high and low skilled workers differently. Column (4) confirms a similar result for gender.
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Table 3: Within-Industry Tariff Changes
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τst -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.135*** -0.130** 0.330***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.083)
τst× female 0.004 0.003 -0.011
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037)
τst× he -0.016 -0.031
(0.017) (0.020)
τst× he × female 0.044
(0.031)
τst× firm 11-50 -0.313***
(0.079)
τst× firm 51-250 -0.384***
(0.084)
τst× firm 251+ -0.448***
(0.075)
firm 11-50 0.432***
(0.008))
firm 51-250 0.597***
(0.010)
firm 251+ 0.618***
(0.009)
Observations 674,206 674,206 674,206 674,206 672,173
R-squared 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.426
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (7) for the period 1993-2001. Only manufacturing
sectors. The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in
informal wage employment. he is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the individual has more than 9
years of education. Individual controls include age and age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether
she/he lives with a partner, is the head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members,
the highest level of education in the household and the share of household members holding a formal job.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the sector-year level are reported in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Overall, both men and women, regardless of their level of education, have higher chances
of being formal employees if they work in an industry that experiences a decline in tariff.
As discussed in Section 4.2, the increases in the probability of formal employment
within tradable industries following trade liberalization may be due to a reallocation of
employment towards trade-oriented firms. These firms, which are expanding to exploit
larger exporting opportunities, tend also to be more intensive in formal jobs (see Nataraj
(2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2014) among others). To further investigate the effect
of trade liberalization on formal employment within tradable sectors, in the last column of
Table 3 we consider the role of firm heterogeneity. Although we do not observe the specific
firm in which workers are employed, we have information about the size of the company,
measured by number of employees, where each individual works. Since trade-oriented firms
are bigger than firms operating only in the domestic market, firm size captures part of the
difference between exporting and domestic firms. Column (5) shows how firm size is related
to formality and how the effect of trade policy differs across firms within each sector. We
control for four classes of firm size: firms with 10 or fewer employees, firms with between
11 and 50 employees, firms with between 51 and 250 employees, and finally firms with
more than 250 employees.18 The estimated coefficients of the firm size dummies show that
the probability of holding a formal job is higher in larger firms. This finding is in line
with the literature on firms and informality, which shows that informal firms tend to be
smaller (see La Porta and Shleifer (2014) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2015) among others).
Considering the effect of a change in trade policy, we find that workers in smaller firms
are less likely to hold a formal job with a drop in tariffs. Trade liberalization increases the
probability of holding a formal job only for workers in medium and large firms (more than
50 employees), with the largest effect for firms with more than 250 employees. Finally,
we find no gender differences in the effect of tariffs across firms.19 Findings in column
(5) suggest that trade-oriented firms are more likely to employ formal workers and drive
18The baseline category is 10 or fewer employees.
19Results available upon request.
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the increase in the probability of being formally employed within sectors following trade
liberalization.
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the effect of trade liberalization on employment composition we use Mexican
tariffs as our main measure of trade policy. However other changes might be both re-
sponsible for changes in formality rates and correlated with Mexican trade liberalization.
For instance, changes in the composition of the labor force, sectoral gender composition,
and others contemporaneous shocks such as inflows of foreign direct investment, exchange
rate volatility, and changes in U.S. import tariffs. Therefore, Table 4 accounts for these
potential omitted variables.
To address the issue of worker selection on unobservable characteristics, we have in-
cluded in all regressions individual determinants of labor force participation and formal
work status that are related to the household characteristics. In particular, we control
for marital status (whether she/he lives with a partner), head of the household, migration
background, the number of household members, the highest level of education in the house-
hold, and the share of household members holding a formal job. All these characteristics
are interacted with the gender dummy to allow for different selection processes by gender.20
To further control for changes in the composition of the labor force, all columns in Table
4 control for birth-year cohorts fixed-effects. This enables us to account for cohort-specific
unobservable characteristics related to the labor market entry of new cohorts. To take into
consideration the relationship between changes in tariffs and changes in the gender com-
position of sectors, columns (2) to (4) include the lag of the sector-specific share of female
20Living with a partner increases the probability of working formally for men but has no effect for women.
Similarly, the head of the household is more likely to hold a formal job, especially among male heads of
household. Both findings are consistent with a traditional division of roles within the household. Migration
reduces the probability of holding a formal job, and even more so for women. The probability of having
a formal job increases with the share of household members holding a formal job which corresponds to a
social norm and/or network effect. This effect is stronger for men. Similar results are found for Brazil in
Ben Yahmed (2018).
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workers. This latter is constructed as the number of female workers in a given sector over
the total number of workers in that sector.
To account for other contemporaneous shocks, in columns (3) and (4) we include inflows
of foreign direct investment entering Mexico and exchange rate movements, respectively.
Data on FDI inflows come from the OECD International direct investment database (Isic
Rev. 3 classification). The quarterly real exchange rate between Mexico and the U.S. is ob-
tained from the Central Bank of Mexico. Finally, since NAFTA is a multilateral agreement
by which the United States reciprocally lowered import tariff to products from Mexico,
column (5) includes U.S. import tariffs.21 A decrease in the U.S. tariff increases the proba-
bility of being formally employed. This result can be related to the findings in Paz (2014)
and McCaig and Pavcnik (2014), who show that reductions in trading partners’ tariffs lead
to a decrease in informality in Brazil and Vietnam respectively. Column (5) shows that
the formalization effect related to the reduction in Mexican import tariff is unaltered, and
its magnitude is slightly reduced by the introduction of U.S. tariffs. Overall, the results in
Table 4 confirm our benchmark findings in Table 3. A decrease in tariffs contributes to the
formalization of jobs within 4-digit industries for all individuals, irrespective of skill level
or gender.
The online appendix provides additional robustness checks. In Table 11, we control for
sector specific pre-trends in formality rates. More precisely, we control for sector-specific
changes in formal labor share over the two preceding years, i.e., ∆ formalitys,(t−1)−(t−3).
Note that pre-trends over a fixed period of time are controlled by the sector fixed-effects.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is marginally decreased but our benchmark
results are confirmed. The formalization effect seems unrelated to pre-existing trends in
formality rates across industries facing different tariff declines.
Finally, we test the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of formal em-
ployment. So far we have focused on wage employment and distinguished formal from
informal employees using information on access to mandated benefits. We also use an al-
21U.S. import tariff data are from Feenstra et al. (2002).
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Table 4: Within-Industry Tariff Changes and Additional Controls
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τst -0.147*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.127**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.062)
τst ×female 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053)
female shares,t−1 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.058
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036)
FDIst 0.000* 0.000* -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RERMEXUSq -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
τUS,st -0.255**
(0.112)
Observations 674,206 673,105 669,967 669,967 357,253
R-squared 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.265 0.299
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (7) for the period 1993-2001. The dependent variable equals 1 if
the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal wage employment. The real exchange rate is computed as
RER = e × CPI(US)/CPI(Mex), where e is the nominal exchange rate in US dollars. U.S. tariff is the U.S. import tariff
applied to Mexico. Individual controls include age, age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether she/he lives with a
partner, is the head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members, the highest level of education in the
household and the share of household members holding a formal job. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
ternative definition of informality that includes self-employed workers who own small firms
(see Henley et al., 2009).22 Table 12 in the online appendix shows that the trade-induced
formalization of employment within 4-digit industries remains significant when we include
self-employment in the informality category. Columns (2) to (4) shows that now the formal-
ization effect is stronger for women, especially low-skilled women. This can be explained
by the lower propensity of women to enter self-employment compared to men.
22Notice that self-employed workers in the ENEU survey report very small businesses. In fact more than
80 percent of the self-employed have no employees.
29
6.2 Additional Threats to Identification
In this section we consider additional concerns regarding threats to internal validity com-
ing from simultaneous causality or others omitted variable bias. Simultaneous causality
may arise in different circumstances. Policy-makers may negotiate different tariff cuts on
industries with high formal employment levels or industries with a higher concentration of
more productive and formal firms may be able to lobby for smaller tariff cuts. Neverthe-
less, several observations indicate that it is unlikely that these concerns are significant in
the case of trade liberalization in Mexico. Qualitative analysis of the political economy of
liberalization in Mexico indicates the reduction in bilateral tariff barriers as the major eco-
nomic goal of the government. To recover from difficult economic times throughout most of
the 1980s, the government tried to stimulate economic growth through entering NAFTA.
The reduction of almost all tariffs on U.S. products resulted in an average reduction of 14
percentage points, from more than 15 percent in 1993 to less than 1.5 percent in 2003.
To provide additional support for the exogeneity of tariffs, we produce a graphical
analysis of the tariff cuts during the Mexico’s liberalization. Figure 3 shows that industries
with the highest pre-NAFTA tariff levels (in 1993) experience the biggest tariff declines
between 1993 and 2001, with a correlation of -0,91.23 This pattern is similar to the one
reported for Columbia by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and for Brazil by Kovak (2013).
Following the argument in these papers, since the reduction in tariffs was almost entirely
determined by pre-liberalization levels and given that we control for sector time-invariant
characteristics, tariffs are unlikely to be endogenous in our specification.
Remaining concerns about endogeneity are addressed by using instrumental variables
technique. To instrument for tariffs, we exploit the initial level of protection in 1993, which
provides industry variation, and we interact it with the real exchange rate between Mexico
and the U.S., which provides time variation. Therefore, our instrument varies across sectors
and years and exploits sector-specific changes in competitiveness due to real exchange rate
23The only exception concerns the manufacture of liquors, for which tariff has remained high.
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Figure 3: Tariff Changes and Pre-NAFTA Tariff Levels
Source: Authors’ calculation based on tariff data from Iacovone and Javorcik (2010)
variations. The instrument is exogenous as, first, the peso devaluation in December 1994 is
considered largely unexpected, meaning that firms could not adjust in advance to absorb
this shock (see Verhoogen, 2008). Moreover, we also control for year fixed-effects so that
the macroeconomic impacts of the peso devaluation and real exchange rate fluctuations are
taken into account. Additionally, any relationship between pre-NAFTA tariff levels and
unobserved sector characteristics are controlled by sector fixed-effects. IV estimates are
reported in Table (5).
Column (1) replicates the results of our benchmark OLS regression, which shows the
formalization effect of tariff cuts within 4-digit sectors. In column (2) we instrument tariffs
with the initial sector tariff level in 1993 interacted with the nominal exchange rate . The
coefficient is close to the OLS estimate. In column (3) and (4) we use the real exchange
rate interacted with the initial sector tariff level as IV for tariffs. In column (4) we also
instrument for the interaction term with the female dummy. The coefficient of tariff remains
negative and significant, but its magnitude is bigger than the OLS estimates. When using
the real exchange rate in the IV strategy, we find that a 14-percentage-point drop in tariffs
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Table 5: Within-Industry Tariff Changes and IV Strategy
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
IV τs,1993 × ER τs,1993 × RER τs,1993 × RER
τst -0.149*** -0.165** -0.525*** -0.526***
(0.054) (0.075) (0.188) (0.183)
τst× female 0.001
(0.056)
Observations 674,222 674,222 674,222 674,222
R-squared 0.251 0.029 0.173 0.173
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IV F-stat 56.6 20.10 10.12
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (7) for the period 1993-2001. Only manufacturing
sectors. The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal
wage employment. Additional controls include age, age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether
she/he lives with a partner, is the head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members,
the highest level of education in the household and the share of household members holding a formal
job. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at sector-year level are reported in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
leads to an increase of 7 percentage points in the probability of working formally, instead
of 2 percentage points according to the OLS estimate. Similarly to our benchmark results
in Table 3, we find no significant gender differences.
7 Empirical Results for Local Labor Markets
We now adopt a local labor market approach and estimate the effect of changes in the
gender-specific regional tariff on female and male formal employment. Since we do not
control for disaggregated industry fixed-effects, this section accounts for between-sector
labor movements within regions. Our benchmark estimation is equation (8), and results
are reported in Table (6).
The literature on the regional effects of trade liberalization does not account for gender
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differences, and uses a local tariff measure weighted by overall employment in each industry
and region. To compare our results with previous findings, in column (1) we use a local tariff
measure not interacted with a gender dummy. We obtain no significant effect of changes in
local exposure to tariffs on the average probability of working formally. Columns (2) to (5)
use gender-specific local tariffs, as described in Section 5.1, and interact them with gender
dummies. Our results show a gender dimension of regional trade liberalization.
More specifically, in column (2), we allow for heterogeneous effects between men and
women, and find that men’s probability of working formally is significantly affected by
changes in regional exposure to tariff barriers. Men living in a region experiencing a
14-percentage-point reduction in tariffs are almost 6 percentage points (14×0.416) more
likely to hold a formal job compared to men in an unaffected region. However, women’s
probability of working formally is not significantly affected. In column (3), we control for
the individual level of education and interact it with the gender-specific tariff measures.
The increase in male formal employment is stronger for high-skilled men. Similarly, high-
skilled women are also more likely to work formally in a municipality exposed to a reduction
in tariffs.
Over the 1990s, the formality rate evolved differently in the tradable and non-tradable
sectors (see Figure 2). Thus, in column (4), we exploit the regional variation in tariffs to
establish different effects in the manufacturing and service sectors. In the manufacturing
sector, the probability of working formally, both for men and women, increases in regions
experiencing a reduction in their average tariff. This formalization of employment is greater
for male workers, whose probability increases by 10 percentage points with a decline in
local tariffs of 14 percentage points (14×0.727). For women, the probability of holding a
formal employment increases by 8 percentage points (14×0.597). The gender difference
is statistically different. Comparing Tables (6) and (3), we see that the formalization
effect of trade across manufacturing sectors is larger than the formalization effect within
4-digit manufacturing sectors. This suggests that regional liberalization generates labor
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reallocation across 4-digit manufacturing industries, which contributes to a formalization
of employment in these industries, especially for men.
We now examine the effect of regional liberalization on formal employment in the service
sectors. In column (4), for both men and women, the tariff coefficient is positive and signifi-
cant. Nevertheless, for men, it is more than compensated by the negative coefficient associ-
ated with τmrt. Therefore, men’s probability of holding a formal job increases with regional
trade liberalization in the service sector as well, though less than in the manufacturing
sector. In contrast, women employed in the service sectors experience a 3-percentage-point
reduction in their probability of working formally following a 14-percentage-point decrease
in local tariffs.
In column (5), we add the level of education, and find that the effect of regional tariffs
differs across gender, sectors and levels of education. In the manufacturing sector, a 14-
percentage-point decline in the municipality tariff leads to a 12-percentage-point increase
in high-skilled men’s probability of finding a formal job. The effect is smaller but still
positive for high-skilled women, whose probability of holding a formal job increases by 10
percentage points.24 In the service sector, the probability of holding a formal job decreases
with trade liberalization for low-skilled women only. More specifically, the probability of
working formally in the service sector falls by 5 percentage points for women with a low level
of educational, while highly educated women are not significantly affected. Highly educated
men working in the service sector experience a formalization of jobs, whereas low-skilled
men do not. To summarize, we find that in the tradable sectors all workers are more likely
to work formally when exposed to tariff reductions, and this formalization effect increases
with workers’ level of education. Similarly in the non-tradable sector, higher education
reduces the odds of working informally following a decline in regional tariffs. This happens
despite the exposure to regional trade liberalization increasing the probability of working
informally for low-skilled women.
24The linear combination τfrt×fe+τfrt×fe×he is significant at the 5% level. The effect on high-skilled
women is statistically different from the effect on high-skilled men at the 1% level.
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Table 6: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing and Service sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τrt -0.162
(0.214)
τmrt -0.416** -0.372** -0.727*** -0.662***
(0.174) (0.179) (0.168) (0.172)
τmrt × he -0.119** -0.229***
(0.057) (0.060)
τmrt × Serv 0.439*** 0.403***
(0.094) (0.098)
τmrt× Serv× he 0.129*
(0.072)
τfrt -0.026 0.037 -0.597*** -0.561***
(0.151) (0.152) (0.157) (0.160)
τfrt × he -0.168*** -0.160***
(0.050) (0.054)
τfrt × Serv 0.803*** 0.934***
(0.091) (0.095)
τfrt × Serv × he -0.236***
(0.071)
Observations 2,648,682 2,648,682 2,648,682 2,648,682 2,648,682
R-squared 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.127 0.128
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE No No No No No
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (8) for the period 1993-2001. The sample is composed of workers in
both the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is in formal wage employment
and 0 if in informal wage employment. The local tariff in columns (2) to (5) is calculated as in equation (6) using as a weight
municipality and sectoral formal employment in 1993. The variable τmrt takes positive values for males, and it is equal to zero
for females. Similarly the variable τfrt takes positive values for females, and it is equal to zero for males. Individual controls
include age and age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether she/he lives with a partner, is the head of the household,
has migrated, the number of household members, the highest level of education in the household and the share of household
members holding a formal job. Columns (3) and (5) also include a high level of education dummy (he) for individuals with
more than 9 years of education and its interaction with a female dummy. Columns (4) and (5) include a dummy for the service
sectors and all necessary interactions with the female and high education dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
clustered by municipality-year pairs are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent
levels respectively.
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Our results suggest that women and men have been affected differently by trade lib-
eralization. In the manufacturing sector, the formalization of jobs occurred for both men
and women, but with different magnitudes. Following our theoretical framework, we in-
terpret the changes in formal employment as driven by reallocation of employment across
sectors. The formalization of employment in the tradable sector corresponds to a situa-
tion in which comparative advantage sectors, which expand through trade, are intensive in
formal labor compared to other tradable and non-tradable sectors. Figure 4 in the online
appendix confirms this for Mexico. During the 1990s Mexican manufacturing sectors with
large net export shares are on average more intensive in formal labor than manufacturing
sectors with low net export shares. We can also use our model to interpret the finding that
the likelihood of holding a formal job has experienced a greater increase for men than for
women. In fact, Prediction 2 states that trade liberalization leads to a greater increase
in the male formal employment share relative to female formal employment share in cases
where male labor is relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor in the CA
sectors.
7.1 Robustness Checks for Local Labor Markets
We now replicate the benchmark estimation for the local labor market approach controlling
for potential confounding factors. Table 7 shows the results. To address the issue of worker
selection on unobservable characteristics, we have included in all regressions individual
determinants of labor force participation and formal work status that are related to the
household characteristics. To eliminate any bias due to labor market entry of new cohorts
during the 1990s, and changing characteristics of the labor force, we include in all columns
5-year birth-cohort dummies. We also control for lagged municipality characteristics, such
as the female share and average level of education in the working population.25 Therefore,
our results should not reflect changes in the composition of the labor force in municipalities
25The female share in a municipality’s working population is computed as the number of female workers
divided by the total number of workers in that municipality.
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facing different tariff exposure.
Columns (3) to (5) in Table 7, control for other macroeconomic contemporary shocks.
We add the inflow of FDI at the municipality level, which is computed as the employment
weighted average of FDI inflows across industries in each municipality. Additionaly, we
also control for any macroeconomic impact of peso fluctuations using the quarterly real
exchange rate.
To account for the nature of the trade reform, i.e., import liberalization versus ex-
port market liberalization, we add gender-specific local exposure to U.S. import tariffs in
columns (2) to (5). The reduction in U.S. tariffs increases the probability of holding a for-
mal job for women and only in column (2). The inclusion of this variable does not alter the
magnitude or significance of the Mexican tariff. The exposure to Mexican tariff reductions
does not capture the effect of exposure to concomitant reductions in U.S. tariffs.
To better explore the role of a trade partner’s tariffs reduction on formal employment,
we replicate the analysis focusing exclusively on U.S. local exposure. The results are in
Table 13 in Appendix C. We find that reductions in U.S. tariffs have similar effects to
reductions in Mexican import tariff, increasing formal employment probability for men
overall. High-skilled women are more likely to work formally if they live in a region exposed
to a significant reduction in U.S. tariffs. However, low-skilled women are less likely to
work formally. Reductions in U.S. tariffs increase the probability of working formally in
the manufacturing sectors for both men and women, but reduce the probability to work
formally for women in the service sectors.
To address the issue of pre-existing trends we control for municipalies’ trends in for-
mality rates in the previous two years using a time-rolling window. Results are shown in
Table 14 in Appendix C and confirm that the results are not merely driven by differences
in pre-existing trends across regions facing different tariff declines.
In another sensitivity check, we account for a broader definition of employment, and
include self-employed individuals in the informal employment category. Table 15 reports
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Table 7: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs and Additional Controls
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing and Service sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τmrt -0.439*** -0.434** -0.425** -0.783*** -0.745***
(0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.173) (0.176)
τmrt × he -0.149**
(0.060)
τmrt× Serv 0.471*** 0.431***
(0.102) (0.105)
τmrt ×Serv×he 0.130*
(0.076)
τfrt -0.078 -0.033 -0.035 -0.768*** -0.726***
(0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.162) (0.164)
τfrt ×he -0.169***
(0.054)
τfrt ×Serv 0.939*** 1.057***
(0.098) (0.101)
τfrt ×Serv×he -0.211***
(0.075)
τUS,mrt -0.123 -0.044 -0.075 -0.083
(0.203) (0.235) (0.231) (0.229)
τUS,frt -0.427* -0.303 -0.051 -0.060
(0.248) (0.268) (0.258) (0.256)
FDI r,t 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RERq,MEX−US 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Educ working pop r,t−1 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female share r,t−1 -0.509*** -0.539*** -0.476*** -0.344*** -0.357***
(0.082) (0.088) (0.091) (0.090) (0.090)
Female share r,t−1× fe 0.250*** 0.261*** 0.203*** 0.143** 0.156**
(0.064) (0.067) (0.075) (0.064) (0.064)
Observations 2,647,786 2,615,443 2,313,412 2,313,412 2,313,412
R-squared 0.114 0.112 0.113 0.139 0.140
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE No No No No No
Birth-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (8) for the period 1993-2001. The dependent variable equals 1 if the
individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal wage employment. The local tariff is calculated as in equation
(6) using as a weight municipality and sectoral employment in 1993. The variable τmrt takes positive values for males,
and it is equal to zero for females. Similarly the variable τfrt takes positive values for females, and it is equal to zero for
males. τUS,mrt and τUS,frt are gender specific U.S. import tariffs. The sample is composed of workers in both tradable and
non-tradable sectors. Individual controls include age, age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether she/he lives with
a partner, is the head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members, the highest level of education in
the household and the share of household members holding a formal job. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
by municipality-year pairs are reported in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
respectively.
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the results and confirms our benchmark findings for the effect of trade liberalization on
regional labor markets. Similarly to the benchmark results in Table 6, we find that, in the
manufacturing sector, the probability of being in formal employment increases, while in
the service sectors informal employment increases for low-skilled women.
Our results on the effect of regional trade liberalization contrasts with those of others
studies on the effect of trade on informality. More specifically, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak
(2017a) find that Brazilian micro-regions more exposed to tariff reductions, experienced
an increase in informality even 20 years after the trade reform. Our different results may
be driven by the specific sample used, country setting and methodology. More precisely,
our focus on gender differences seems relevant because men and women might be affected
differently by trade policy. In fact, in those municipalities exposed to large tariff reductions
we find an increase in formality only for men. This result is different from what we find
when pooling men and women together, column (1) in Table 6, where the effect of the trade
reform on informality is insignificant.
Additionally, our data only cover urban areas. Because of occupation and industry
composition, these areas might be affected differently than rural areas. It is important to
notice that, over our sample period, Mexican urban areas are characterized by a large and
increasing share of employment in manufacturing sectors. These sectors have been directly
and positively affected by the NAFTA multilateral agreement. In this respect, our results
are consistent with the findings in Atkin (2016), who documents a formal employment
boom in Mexican export-oriented manufacturing industries: between 1989 and 1999, 65%
of the growth in formal employment in manufacturing industries stem from export-oriented
industries. Moreover, he shows that many of those new jobs were low-skilled jobs, which
may have facilitated the move from informal to formal jobs for informal workers with low
skills. It is also worth noting that our findings are in line with some of the findings in
Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011). In Table 9 they show that lower intermediate-input
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tariffs are associated with significantly lower odds of transitioning into unemployment and
out of the labor force, resulting in a significantly higher number of transitions into formality.
However, reductions in product-market tariffs have the opposite effect. In the case of
Mexico, export-oriented sectors benefited from the drop in Mexican tariffs as intermediate
inputs became cheaper. Indeed, Mexican exports to the U.S. use a very high share of U.S.
inputs (de Gortari, 2017). Differences in global supply-chains may be partially responsible
for differing effects of import tariff reductions on formal employment across countries.
Finally, unlike Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017a) who exploit decennial changes, we use
annual time series variation in tariffs. Therefore our estimates capture the short-run effects
of trade policy. To compare our findings to longer-term studies such as Dix-Carneiro and
Kovak (2017a), we also adopt a long difference identification strategy. We use data for 1993
and 2000 to evaluate the effect of local exposure to tariff reduction on formal employment
probability. Our strategy is described in Appendix D, and results are presented in Table
16. Although the signs of the coefficients are similar to our benchmark results in Table
6, the long difference strategy shows no significant effect of trade liberalization on formal
employment probability. Our need to control for past trends, which are created using
municipality information during the 1980s, introduces a limitation. In fact, this information
is available only for a small subset of municipalities. This might explain the lack of precision
in the estimates.
7.2 Employment Margins
Our theoretical framework stresses labor reallocation across sectors as a mechanism through
which trade affects formal relative to informal employment. An alternative mechanism is
related to shifts between employment and non-employment (Menezes-Filho and Muendler,
2011; Gaddis and Pieters, 2017). We then explore additional employment margins to
evaluate the impact of trade liberalization on formality across gender, and use an alternative
sample composed of the whole working-age population. In addition to individuals in formal
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and informal paid employment, our new sample also includes individuals who are not in
paid employment, either because they are unemployed or out of the labor force. Table 17 in
the online Appendix presents the results. In column (1), the dependent variable takes the
value 1 if the individual is in paid employment (either in formal or informal employment),
and the value 0 if the individual is not in paid employment (either unemployed or out
of the labor force). Column (1) shows that trade liberalization contributes to a small
increase in female paid employment probability, but did not lead to a significant change in
male paid employment probability. These findings differ from those in Gaddis and Pieters
(2017) for Brazil, where the exposure to trade liberalization has instead reduced labor force
participation for both men and women.
We then consider shifts from formal employment into informal employment and non-
employment. Specifically, columns (2) to (5) use as a dependent variable a categorical
variable equal to 1 if the individual holds a formal job, and to 0 if she/he is either an informal
worker, unemployed or out of the labor force. Column (2) shows that both women and
men are more likely to be formally employed with stronger exposure to trade liberalization.
This differs from our benchmark results, in column (2) of Table 6, where the effect of
local tariffs is insignificant for women. Therefore, we conclude that exposure to tariff
reduction has contributed to the movement of women from non-employment into formal
employment. Using Brazilian household panel data, Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011)
find that a reduction in intermediate inputs tariffs decreases the probability of transitions
from formal employment into unemployment and non-participation. In other words, it
increases the probability of remaining in or moving to formal employment. Meanwhile,
they find the opposite effect for reductions in product market tariffs. Similarly to their
findings for intermediate input tariffs, we find that the likelihood of formal employment
relative to other employment statuses has increased with Mexican tariff reductions.
Comparing tradable and non-tradable sectors, column (4) shows that accounting for the
employment margin confirms the formalization effect of trade liberalization in the manu-
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facturing sector, and the informalization of female jobs in the service sector. Similarly to
the benchmark results, column (5) shows that the decrease in women’s formal employment
probability in the service sectors is driven by low-skilled women.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we theoretically and empirically analyze the link between trade liberalization
and formal employment, allowing for gender differences. We estimate how changes in trade
policy affects men’s and women’s probability of holding a formal job both at the industry
and municipality level using Mexican individual data and tariff information at the 4-digit
industry category. We find that a fall in the Mexican tariff generates a formalization of
employment within 4-digit manufacturing sectors for both men and women, especially for
those employed in large firms. We interpret the within-industry findings as evidence of
labor reallocation towards trade-oriented firms with higher formal job shares.
Constructing a weighted average of tariffs at the municipality level, we show that the
local effects of changes in trade policy vary across gender and sectors. We find that, in the
manufacturing sector, trade liberalization increased the probability of working formally for
both women and men, and especially for men. Consistent with our theoretical predictions,
the results at the local level can be explained by the reallocation of employment into com-
parative advantage sectors, which are relatively more intensive in formal jobs, and where
male labor is relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor. Regional trade
liberalization contributes to the formalization of jobs in tradable sectors, but not neces-
sarily in the non-tradable sectors. We find that, in the service sectors, women, especially
those with a low educational level, experience an increase in informality. The increase in
informality among female employees in the service sector may raise challenges for gender
equality.
Our main contribution is to extend previous studies on globalisation and gender by
analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on gender differences in access to formal jobs.
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The paper remains silent about the potential impact of trade liberalization on male and
female wages in formal and informal jobs. Exploring this channel may further improve our
understanding of gender inequality in the labor market, and additional research is needed
in this direction.
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Online Appendix
Gender, Informal Employment and Trade
liberalization in Mexico
Appendix A provides data information and additional descriptive statistics. Appendices
B and C provide robustness checks for the empirical analysis at the industry and local labor
market levels. Appendix F provides the derivations of the model.
A Data Appendix
Mexican import ad-valorem tariffs on U.S. products at the 4-digit level follow CAE classi-
fication. Tariff data were originally available at the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS), and
are matched to the Mexican CMAP classification as explained in Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010) and Iacovone et al. (2015). We use a correspondence table to link tariff classi-
fication at the CMAP to ENEU industry-employment classification at the CAE level.26
Since CMAP classification is more disaggregated than the CAE classification, we average
Mexican import tariffs at the 4-digit of the CAE classification.
We exploit the ENEU survey to gather information on formal and informal employees,
as well as self-employed individuals in urban areas over the period 1993-2001. We drop
agricultural and mining sectors due to the very limited number of observations. Thus,
the non-manufacturing sectors essentially include the services sectors. Table 8 provides
summary statistics on the number of municipalities and 4-digit industries in our sample, as
well as on the number of observations. Between 1993 and 2001, 216 different municipalities
have been surveyed, although not continuously. In a given year, we have data on 180
municipalities on average. This results in about 6,000 observations per municipality and
year on average.
26We thank Beata Javorcik for providing us with the Mexican tariff data and Eric Verhoogen for the
correspondence table between CMAP and CAE.
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Table 8: Summary Statistics on the data set
Variable Number per year Observations per year Observations
mean max min mean max min 1993-2001
Municipality 180 202 131 5,938 13,552 1 3,172,253
Industry (4-digit) 257 259 254 15,696 50,037 1 3,172,253
... with import tariff 114 126 90 3,357 13,766 1 738,638
Notes: Calculation based on the ENEU data for the period 1993-2001. Column 1 displays the
mean, minimum and maximum number of municipality/industry per year. Column 2 displays
the mean, minimum and maximum number of observations per municipality/industry and year.
Column 3 displays the overall number of observations per municipality/industry over the whole
period. The sample is composed of formal and informal employees, and self-employed between 16
and 60 years old. Industries with information on Mexican import tariff applied on U.S. goods are
manufacturing industries.
Table 9 provides statistics on the change in municipality tariffs over the 1990s for
different measures of local tariff. The evolution of municipality exposure to Mexican tariffs
is given in the first four columns. Column (1) describes the standard local tariff measure
that weights sector tariff with municipality×sector employment. The second column gives a
local tariff measure that accounts for the size of the formal sector. In fact, the sectoral tariff
is weighted by municipality×sector formal employment. Both local tariff measures have
decreased on average by 14 percentage points and they have similar distributions. The third
column gives the women’s exposure to tariff change as the sector tariff is weighted by female
formal employment while the fourth columns gives the male exposure to tariff change. On
average, women have been exposed to slightly bigger tariff drops (15.1 percentage points)
compared to men (13.8 percentage points). This reflects the different distribution of men
and women across tradable industries. Women were working in industries that experienced
stronger tariff reductions between 1993 and 2001. The last two columns show the female
and male exposure to reductions in the US tariffs and the pattern is very similar.
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of men and women working as
formal employees, informal employees or self-employed. Focusing on 1993, we observe
that employees are on average younger than self-employed individuals, especially among
women. Formal employees have higher levels of education than informal employees and the
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Table 9: Municipality Exposure to Tariff Change 1993-2001
Mexican tariff (import tariff) US tariff (export tariff)
∆τrt ∆τfrt ∆τmrt ∆τUS,rt ∆τUS,frt ∆τUS,mrt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean -.143 -.151 -.138 -.016 -.015 -.016
p25 -.152 -.17 -.145 -.019 -.02 -.021
p50 -.142 -.1465 -.137 -.008 -.008 -.008
p75 -.13 -.1335 -.128 -.004 -.002 -.004
Notes: The sample is composed of 119 municipalities surveyed both in 1993 and
2001. Column (1) uses the standard local tariff measure that weights sector tariff with
municipality×sector employment. Local tariffs in columns (2) and (3) give changes in fe-
male and male exposure to Mexican tariffs as constructed as in equation (6). Column (4)
provides changes in exposure to US tariffs using overall employment weights. Columns (5)
and (6) give changes in female and male exposure to US tariffs using gender-specific formal
employment weights similarly to equation (6).
self-employed. Female formal employees are slightly more educated than their male coun-
terparts, however we observe the reverse among informal employees and especially among
self-employed. Self-employed women have on average more children and work fewer hours
than female employees, which might indicate that self-employment is a way for women
to combine work and family responsibilities. Informal employees receive on average the
lowest hourly wages. The employment category with the highest average hourly earnings
is self-employment for men and formal wage employment for women. Finally, formal wage
workers are employed in bigger firms compared to informal wage workers.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics on the Sample of Working Individuals
Formal Informal Self-employed
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Age 33.25 31.14 29.48 28.38 37.75 38.12
Years of schooling 10.04 9.67 9.01 9.39 8.73 7.38
Primary education or less 0.28 0.26 0.35 0.29 0.44 0.55
Secondary education 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.33 0.26
Tertiary education 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.19
Live in couple 0.70 0.41 0.53 0.31 0.76 0.56
Number of children . 1.38 . 1.23 . 3.19
Has migrated 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Head of the household 0.67 0.15 0.48 0.13 0.75 0.25
Household size 2.29 2.63 2.54 2.79 2.24 2.49
Share of formal employees 0.36 0.52 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.31
Max education level in household 11.55 12.24 10.79 11.98 10.64 10.53
Work less than 35 hours a week 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.53
...between 35 and 48 hours a week 0.66 0.65 0.53 0.55 0.41 0.21
...more than 48 hours a week 0.22 0.07 0.29 0.15 0.24 0.08
Log hourly earnings 3.82 3.86 3.54 3.58 3.89 3.67
Work in a firm with less than 10 empl. 0.10 0.08 0.55 0.39 1 1
...with 11 to 50 employees 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.15 0 0
...51 to 250 employees 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.05 0 0
...more than 250 people 0.62 0.71 0.28 0.40 0 0
N 107,091 63,296 43,791 15,873 30,663 11,217
Notes: Calculation based on the ENEU data for 1993.
B Robustness Checks Within Tradable Industries
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Table 11: Within-industry Tariffs and Additional Controls
Controls Benchmark Past formality trend Past formality trend & US tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
τst -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.132*** -0.121** -0.128** -0.117* -0.117*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
τst × female 0.036 0.039 0.038 0.041 0.042 0.055 0.055
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055)
τst× he -0.027 -0.028* -0.027 -0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
τst× he × female -0.017 -0.016 -0.045 -0.045
(0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.038)
∆ formalitys,(t−1)−(t−3) 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
τUS,st -0.265** -0.265** -0.265**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107)
Observations 674,206 674,206 674,206 674,206 360,928 360,928 360,928
R-squared 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.292 0.292 0.292
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (7) for the period 1993-2001.The sample includes
manufacturing sectors only in municipalities already surveyd in 1990 to control for past trends in formality
rates. The dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal
wage employment. he is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the individual has more than 9 years of
education. Individual controls include age and age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether she/he
lives with a partner, is the head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members, the
highest level of education in the household and the share of household members holding a formal job.
∆ formalitys,(t−1)−(t−3) is the change in formal labor share in sector s over the two preceding years.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the sector-year level are reported in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 12: Within-Industry Tariff Changes and Self-Employment
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
among Employees in Manufacturing Sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τst -0.463*** -0.375*** -0.390*** -0.374***
(0.113) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092)
τst × female -0.188** -0.184** -0.226***
(0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
τst × he 0.043** 0.000
(0.020) (0.022)
τst × he × female 0.134***
(0.033)
Observations 738,622 738,622 738,622 738,622
R-squared 0.362 0.362 0.362 0.363
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (7) for the period 1993-2001. The dependent variable equals 1 if the
individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal wage employment or in self-employment. Individual controls
include age, age2, years of education, a female dummy, whether she/he lives with a partner, is the head of the household,
has migrated, the number of household members, the highest level of education in the household and the share of household
members holding a formal job. Columns (1) to (4) provides estimates of the effect of changes in 4-digit sector tariff lines
on the probability of holding a formal job within 4-digit manufacturing sectors. Columns (3) and (4) include a dummy for
higher level of education (he) for those individuals with more than 9 years of education, and its interaction with the female
dummy respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels respectively.
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C Robustness Checks for Local Labor Markets
Table 13: Municipality Exposure to U.S. Import Tariffs
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
Employees in Manufacturing and Service sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τUS,mrt -0.626*** -0.447* -1.217*** -1.145***
(0.212) (0.247) (0.311) (0.324)
τUS,mrt × he -0.517** -0.274
(0.262) (0.232)
τUS,mrt × Serv 0.766* 0.835*
(0.406) (0.442)
τUS,mrt × Serv × he -0.084
(0.338)
τUS,frt 0.130 0.481* -1.575*** -1.534***
(0.249) (0.276) (0.392) (0.413)
τUS,frt × he -0.566*** -0.159
(0.211) (0.238)
τUS,frt × Serv 2.569*** 3.103***
(0.470) (0.521)
τUS,frt × Serv × he -1.193***
(0.341)
Educ working popr,t−1 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female sharer,t−1 -0.518*** -0.533*** -0.422*** -0.435***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Female sharer,t−1× fe 0.238*** 0.304*** 0.188*** 0.201***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.060) (0.060)
Observations 2,618,322 2,618,322 2,618,322 2,618,322
R-squared 0.112 0.101 0.136 0.137
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (8) for the period 1993-2001. The dependent variable equals 1 if
the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal wage employment. Individual controls are the same as in
Table (6). Columns (2) and (4) also include a high level of education dummy (he) for individuals with more than 9 years
of education, and its interaction with the female dummy. Columns (3) and (4) also include a service sector dummy and its
interaction with the female dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 14: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs and Additional Controls
Controls Benchmark Past formality trend Past formality trend & US tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
τmrt -0.220 -0.484*** -0.137 -0.402*** -0.129 -0.377*** -0.271*
(0.144) (0.143) (0.129) (0.132) (0.132) (0.135) (0.142)
τmrt ×he -0.340***
(0.074)
τmrt × Serv 0.353*** 0.353*** 0.341*** 0.405***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.118) (0.130)
τmrt ×Serv×he -0.093
(0.086)
τfrt 0.055 -0.387*** 0.125 -0.312** 0.138 -0.320** -0.268*
(0.128) (0.142) (0.112) (0.132) (0.117) (0.136) (0.139)
τfrt ×he -0.206***
(0.066)
τfrt ×Serv 0.659*** 0.649*** 0.650*** 0.851***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.119)
τfrt ×Serv×he -0.386***
(0.089)
∆ formalityr,(t−1)−(t−3) 0.213*** 0.204*** 0.225*** 0.216*** 0.214***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
τUS,mrt×ma -0.156 -0.243 -0.257
(0.229) (0.225) (0.220)
τUS,frt×fe -0.178 -0.061 -0.086
(0.272) (0.257) (0.255)
Observations 2,224,035 2,224,035 2,224,035 2,224,035 2,202,066 2,202,066 2,202,066
R-squared 0.103 0.129 0.103 0.129 0.101 0.127 0.129
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (8) for the period 1993-2001. Smaller sample of muncipalities with
information on formality rates in t−3: 63 municipalities in 1993, 143 municipalities in 2001. Individual controls are the same
as in Table (6). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5
and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 15: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs and Self-Employment
Dependent variable Probability of Working Formally
Employees and Self-employed in Manufacturing and Service sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τmrt -0.223 -0.152 -0.749*** -0.699***
(0.164) (0.168) (0.156) (0.160)
τmrt×he -0.194*** -0.188***
(0.065) (0.062)
τ mrt×Serv 0.800*** 0.820***
(0.115) (0.120)
τmrt×Serv×he -0.013
(0.076)
τfrt -0.107 -0.064 -1.188*** -1.170***
(0.145) (0.147) (0.183) (0.188)
τfrt×he -0.120* -0.079
(0.066) (0.077)
τfrt×Serv 1.439*** 1.579***
(0.148) (0.153)
τfrt×Serv×he -0.309***
(0.091)
Education working popr,t−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female share r,t−1 -0.371*** -0.389*** -0.144* -0.164**
(0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.077)
Female share r,t−1× fe -0.042 -0.017 -0.299*** -0.277***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Observations 3,126,066 3,126,066 3,126,066 3,126,066
R-squared 0.080 0.081 0.112 0.114
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth-cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are LPM estimations of equation (8) for the period 1993-2001. The dependent variable equals 1 if
the individual is in formal wage employment and 0 if in informal wage employment or in self-employment. The local tariff is
calculated as in equation (6) using as a weight municipality and sectoral formal employment in 1993. The variable τmrt takes
positive values for males, and it is equal to zero for females. Similarly the variable τfrt takes positive values for females, and
it is equal to zero for males. Individual controls are the same as in Table (6). Columns (2) and (4) also include a high level
of education dummy (he) for individuals with more than 9 years of education, and its interaction with the female dummy.
Columns (3) and (4) also include a service sector dummy and its interaction with the female dummy Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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D Long-run Estimates of Local Exposure to Tariffs
To analyze the long-term effect of local exposure to tariff changes, we follow Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak (2017a) estimate a specification of the following form:
∆PFgr,2000−1993 = θ∆τgr,2000−1993 + ∆Xr,2000−1993 + αs,2000 + ∆PFgr,1993−1986 + r,t (9)
the dependent variable, ∆PFgr,2000−1993, is the change in the probability of formal employ-
ment in region r between 1993 and 2000 for group g. Group g is either all individuals
pooled together, or g = {female,male} when we distinguish by gender. ∆τgr,2000−1993 is
the change in the local tariff and ∆Xr,2000−1993 is the change in municipality characteristics
between 1993 and 2000. We control for the education level of the working population and
the female share. αs,2000 are state fixed-effects and ∆PFgr,1993−1986 is a pre-NAFTA trend
in the outcome.
The probability of formal employment for each year and municipality PFgrt is calculated
in a first-step following a similar approach than Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003):
Formalirt = Xirt +Mgrt + irt.
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i in municipality
r is formally employed at time t. Xirt is a set of individual controls including a female
dummy, age, age squared, years of education, whether she/he lives with a partner, is the
head of the household, has migrated, the number of household members, the highest level
of education in the household and the share of household members holding a formal job.
The municipality fixed-effects Mgrt are estimated for each year and gender group separetely.
They capture the probability of being in formal employment, cancelling out the effect of
individual characteristics. In that way, we control for changes in the composition of the
working population. We then use the adjusted municipality probability of formal employ-
ment to compute the dependent variable and the pre-trend in equation (9). The results
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based on 63 municipalities for which we have data during the mid-1980s are presented in
Table 16.
Table 16: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs between 1993 and 2000
Dependent variable Adjusted Probability of Formal Employment
(1) (2) (3)
No gender Gender Gender & sector
∆τr,2000−1993 0.626
(0.651)
∆τmr,2000−1993 -0.276
(0.506))
∆τfr,2000−1993 0.727
(0.516)
∆τmr,2000−1993×Manuf -0.665
(1.236)
∆τmr,2000−1993×Serv -0.549
(0.395)
∆τfr,2000−1993×Manuf -0.920
(0.554)
∆τfr,2000−1993×Serv 0.682
(0.647)
∆PFgr,1993−1986 -0.485** -0.301*** -0.413***
(0.181) (0.099) (0.112)
Educ working pop r,t−1 0.021 0.026* 0.037***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
Female share r,t−1 -0.276 -0.758* -0.682
(0.579) (0.414) (0.460)
Female share r,t−1× fe 0.333** 0.343*
(0.129) (0.175)
Observations 63 122 242
R-squared 0.641 0.458 0.386
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The regressions are estimations of equation (9) for the period 1993-2000. The dependent variable is the change in the
adjusted probability of formal employment at the municipality level ∆PFgr,t. In column (1), PFr,t varies by municipality-
year. In column (2), PFr,t varies by municipality-year and gender. In column (3), PFr,t varies by municipality-year, gender
and 1-digit sector. Columns (2) and (3) include a female dummy. Column (3) also includes a service sector dummy and its
interaction with the female dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-year level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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E Employment Margin
Table 17: Municipality Exposure to Tariffs and the Employment margin
Dependent variable Employment Formal wage employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τmrt -0.004 -0.224*** -0.179** -0.466*** -0.473***
(0.038) (0.077) (0.083) (0.108) (0.110)
τmrt ×he -0.106** -0.038
(0.043) (0.057)
τmrt × Serv 0.522*** 0.591***
(0.134) (0.137)
τmrt ×Serv×he -0.123
(0.106)
τfrt -0.097*** -0.108* -0.019 -0.200*** -0.205***
(0.029) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
τfrt ×he -0.277*** -0.021
(0.065) (0.026)
τfrt ×Serv 0.309*** 0.512***
(0.066) (0.070)
τfrt ×Serv×he -0.474***
(0.120)
Educ working popr,t−1 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003* -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female share r,t−1 0.077** -0.364*** -0.359*** -0.337*** -0.331***
(0.036) (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059)
Female share r,t−1× fe 1.183*** 0.829*** 0.821*** 0.391*** 0.384***
(0.030) (0.053) (0.053) (0.065) (0.066)
Observations 7,767,738 7,194,824 7,194,824 7,193,669 7,193,669
R-squared 0.289 0.171 0.171 0.230 0.234
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The sample includes individuals aged 16 to 60 years in formal employment, informal employment, unemployed or out
of the labor force. We exclude employers from the sample as we did not include them in the benchmark sample. In column
1, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual is in paid (formal or informal) employment and takes the value
0 if the individual is unemployed or out of the labor force. In columns 2 to 5, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the
individual is in formal employment and takes the value 0 if the individual is in informal employment, unemployed or out of
the labor force. Individual controls are the same as in Table (6). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality-year level.
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.
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F Theory Appendix
E.1. Model Derivations
This section develops the general equilibrium model from which we obtain the change in
formal labor demands in section 4, equations (3) and (4). We follow Blum (2008) and
Kovak (2013), and deviate from the latter by having two types of labor, male and female
labor, and from both papers by having two types of job within each sector, formal and
informal jobs.
We consider a country composed of several regions r. Each region is composed of several
industries indexed s = {1, ...N}. Production uses capital, K, female labor Lf and male
labor Lm. Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile across industries but not across regions,
supplied inelastically, and fully employed. The elasticity of substitution between female
labor and capital differ from the elasticity of substitution between male labor and capital.
Capital is assumed to be region and sector specific in the short-run. We also assume
that production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, and that factors and goods
markets are competitive. Technologies may differ across sectors but are the same across
regions for each sector.
The set of exogenous variables is composed by: prices of tradable goods, factor sup-
plies, sectoral capital allocation, preferences, and technologies. The endogenous variables
to be determined are: factor returns, prices of non-tradable goods, sectoral employment
allocations, and sectoral output. In what follows, we only consider a particular region and
suppress the subscript r on all terms. The equilibrium is characterized by the following set
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of equations:
aksys = Ks ∀s, s = 1, 2, ..., N (10)
N∑
s=1
agsys = Lg g = (f,m) (11)
afswf + amswm + aksrs = ps ∀s (12)
cs =
κI
ps
s = M + 1,M + 2, ..., N (13)
where aks and ags are unit input coefficients for each factor of production in sector s, with
g = {f,m}. wf and wm are female and male wage respectively, rs is the specific factor
return in sector s, ys and ps are respectively the output and output price in industry s.
Equations (10) and (11) represent full employment conditions for the specific factor in
sector s, Ks, and for mobile factors, Lg. Equation (12) represents the zero profit condition.
Equation (13) is the aggregate demand for non-tradable goods, with cs the Cobb-Douglas
demand of the non-tradable good in sector s. Tradable and non-tradable goods are indexed
s = 1, ...,M and s = M + 1, ..., N respectively. The exogenous share of formal jobs in each
sector is denoted αs. Therefore, group g formal employment in sector s is defined as:
Lϕgs = αsLgs (14)
Differentiating the above system of equilibrium conditions and using Jones’ algebra, we
obtain:
pˆs = θfswˆf + θmswˆm + θksrˆs =
∑
g
θgswˆg + θksrˆs (15)
Lˆgs = aˆgs − aˆks + Kˆs (16)
Kˆs = aˆks + yˆs (17)
where hats represents proportional change, θgs =
agswg
ps
and θks =
aksrs
ps
are cost shares of
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factors Lg and Ks in sector s. Using equation (17) inside equation (16), gives labor demand
in industry s:
Lˆgs = aˆgs − aˆks (18)
For each sector s, the elasticity of substitution between labor factor Lg and the specific
factor Ks with respect to the relative returns of factors Lg and Ks is defined as:
σggk,s =
aˆks − aˆgs
wˆg − rˆs (19)
We can rewrite the female and male labor demands in sector s, equation (18), using the
elasticity of substitution in equation (19), to get:
Lˆfs = −σffk,s(wˆf − rˆs)− σmfk,s(wˆm − rˆs) + Kˆs (20)
Lˆms = −σmmk,s(wˆf − rˆs)− σffk,s(wˆm − rˆs) + Kˆs (21)
We want now to express the change in female and male labor demands in sector s as
functions of prices. Using the differentiated zero-profit condition, equation (15), the fact
that Ks is fixed and specific to each sector (so that Kˆs = 0, ∀s), and that cost shares add
up to one, the change in labor demands in sector s becomes:
Lˆfs = −
[
σffk,s
θks + θfs
θks
+ σmfk,s
θf,s
θks
]
(wˆf − pˆs)−
[
σmfk,s
θks + θms
θks
+ σffk,s
θf,s
θks
]
(wˆm − pˆs) (22)
Lˆms = −
[
σmmk,s
θks + θms
θks
+ σfmk,s
θm,s
θks
]
(wˆm − pˆs)−
[
σfmk,s
θks + θms
θks
+ σmmk,s
θm,s
θks
]
(wˆf − pˆs) (23)
where σggk,s is the elasticity of substitution between factor Lg and the specific factor Ks
with respect to the relative factor prices of Lg and Ks in each sector s, θf,s and θm,s are
cost share of factors Lf and Lm respectively. Finally, wˆf and wˆf are factors price changes,
which depend on ps as in equations (27) and (28).
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Equations (22) and (23) shows that the demand for labor Lg in sector s increases with
the price of good s and decreases with the wage paid to factor Lg. As standard in the
Ricardo-Viner set up, the magnitude of the wage change is always smaller than the price
change, so that the change in sectoral labor demand follows the sign of the price change.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Following an increase in the price of good s, factors
demands increase in sector s. Labor is mobile across sectors, therefore workers move to
sector s until wages are equalized across sectors. Since capital is sector-specific and fixed
in the short run, it becomes a scarce resource in sector s. Thus, the rental rate of capital,
rs, increases more than the price, ps. Therefore, the wage increases, but proportionally less
than the price.
In the following section, we derive equilibrium wage equations for men and women in
order to to analyze the effect of an increase in the price of goods on labor demand.
Deriving male and female wages.
To solve for the wages of men and women, we use the following system of equations:
Lˆf =
∑
s
λfs
(
σffk,s(rˆs − wˆf ) + σmfk,s(rˆs − wˆm)
)
(24)
Lˆm =
∑
s
λms
(
σmmk,s(rˆs − wˆm) + σfmk,s(rˆs − wˆf )
)
(25)
pˆs = θfswˆf + θmswˆm + θksrˆs ∀s (26)
where λfs and λms are the fraction of female and male labor used in sector s respectively.
Equations (24) to (26) can be written in matrix form and solved for factor prices to get:
 Rˆ
Wˆ
 =
A B
C D

−1 Pˆ
Lˆ

where Rˆ and Pˆ are (N × 1) column vectors; Wˆ and Lˆ are (2× 1) column vectors; A, B, C
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and D are elements of the block matrices. Exploiting the fact that labor supply is fixed,
Lˆf = Lˆm = 0, and the rule for the inversion of partitioned matrices, we can solve for the
equilibrium values of wˆf and wˆm. This gives:
wˆf =
1
∆
N∑
s=1
1
θks
[
Ψ1(σ
f
fk,s + σ
m
fk,s)λfs −Ψ2(σmmk,s + σfmk,s)λms
]
pˆs (27)
wˆm =
1
∆
N∑
s=1
1
θks
[
Ψ3(σ
m
mk,s + σ
f
mk,s)λms −Ψ4(σffk,s + σmfk,s)λfs
]
pˆs (28)
where
Ψ1 =
N∑
s=1
λsm
(
σmmk,s
θks + θms
θks
+ σfmk,s
θms
θks
)
Ψ2 =
N∑
s=1
λsm
(
σfmk,s
θks + θfs
θks
+ σmmk,s
θfs
θks
)
Ψ3 =
N∑
s=1
λsf
(
σffk,s
θks + θfs
θks
+ σfmk,s
θfs
θks
)
Ψ4 =
N∑
s=1
λsf
(
σmfk,s
θks + θms
θks
+ σffk,s
θms
θks
)
∆ =Ψ4 ×Ψ2 −Ψ3 ×Ψ1
Equations (27) and (28) shows that a price increase in industry s increases the regional
wage. Substituting equations (27) and (28) into (22) and (23) we obtain the relationship
between female and male labor demands in sector s and a price change in good s.
The effects of trade on female and male employment at the sector level.
Moving from autarky to trade integration corresponds to an increase in the price of the
CA sector, pˆs > 0. The price increase in sector s raises the amount of both types of labor
64
hired by sector s, but not necessarily in the same proportion. If in sector s, male labor is
relatively more substitutable for capital than female labor, and the fraction of male labor
is bigger than the fraction of female labor, the price raise leads to a larger increase in male
labour demand than in female labour demand.27
Accordingly, trade liberalization leads to a larger increase in male labor compared to
female labor in those CA sectors where male labor demand is relatively more elastic than fe-
male labor demand and the fraction of male labor is bigger than the fraction of female labor.
The non-tradable good prices
The presence of non-tradable sectors does not alter the results obtained in equations (27)
and (28). To solve for the non-tradable equilibrium good prices we need to assume specific
consumers’ preferences. For this we follow Blum (2008) and Kovak (2013) in assuming
Cobb-Douglas preferences to solve for the supply and demand of the non-tradable goods
produced in sectors i = M + 1, ..., N , as well as their equilibrium prices.
E.2. CA Sectors and Formal Labor in Mexico
The theoretical predictions depend on CA sectors being more formal labor intensive than
non-CA sectors. To verify this assumption, we plot formal labor intensity in 1993 against
average net export share. Figure 4 shows that sectors with higher net export share
( exports−imports
production
) are associated with higher formal labor intensity (formal labors
total labors
) at the start
of the period in 1993.
27The fact that male labor is more substitutable than female can also be stated in terms of labor demand
elasticities: in this case the demand for male labor is more elastic than the demand for female labor. The
labor demand elasticity for labor factor g is defined as
∂Lgs
∂(wg/ps)
wg/ps
Lgs
.
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Figure 4: Formal Labor Intensity and Trade Share at the Sector Level
Notes: Sector level information at the 3-digit level for manufacturing industries. Formal labor intensity in 1993 calculated
with the ENEU data from INEGI, Mexico. Trade shares are calculated using TradeProd database from CEPII, developed by
De Sousa et al. (2012).
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